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Litigating the Separation of Powers
By
Elizabeth Earle Beske1
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INTRODUCTION
In marked contrast to its predecessor, the Roberts Court has carved a clear and confident
role for itself in adjudicating separation-of-powers disputes. Examining the Constitution’s text,
structure, and history to determine the respective authority of Congress and the Executive, the
Roberts Court has proclaimed, is “what courts do.”2 And yet, to field these cases, the Court has
often been constrained by Rehnquist-era precedent to prefer individual private litigants over
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Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012). Professors Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz described the case as
a “vivid defense of the role courts play in proclaiming the law” and a “ringing proclamation of judicial power to
state the law.” Laurence Tribe & Joshua Matz, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
299-300 (2014).
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institutional actors,3 even where doing so is difficult to square with the niceties of Article III and
even where reliance on individual litigants means some separation-of-powers problems may
never be resolved. Obvious stakeholders, the institutional actors, have faced a tough-toimpossible climb in bringing disputes before the courts, and the Supreme Court’s preference for
individual claimants has required it to engage in some crafty, if occasionally dubious, moves to
ensure a steady diet of claims.4 This article examines the Court’s reliance on individual litigants
to raise separation-of-powers claims and finds significant problems, both doctrinal and practical.
It proceeds to reexamine the Court’s treatment of institutional standing and argues that there is
both room to maneuver around the more concerning limitations of Raines v. Byrd,5 the decadesold case that effectively shut down congressional, and, by implication, most institutional
standing, and – more importantly – strong reason to do so in the limited circumstances where
institutional actors lack the ability to self-help.6 There are both doctrinal and prudential reasons
to be skeptical of wide-ranging institutional standing; however, there are identifiable
circumstances where it is necessary, and placing the mantle primarily on individual litigants
limits the role of real parties in interest, results in scattershot rulings, and rests uneasily with
conventional notions of judicial power.
The increasingly formalist7 Roberts Court has been a frequent and comparatively
enthusiastic participant in the separation-of-powers sphere. Consistent with its confidence
playing the role announced in in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (“Zivotofsky I”),8 the Roberts Court has
repeatedly fielded cases in which litigants have claimed congressional incursions on the domain
of Article III courts,9 examined the President’s authority to make recess appointments and
thereby elide the Senate confirmation process,10 and jumped in to defend the prerogatives of the
executive vis-à-vis Congress, particularly in the Appointments Clause context.11 In Trump v.
Mazars USA, LLP,12 the Court refereed a clash between Congress and the President over
This article will contrast “individual litigants,” generally private individuals, with “institutional litigants,” who are
actors situated within one of the three coordinate branches of government.
4
See infra notes _ - _ and accompanying text.
5
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
6
David Pozen first brought the term “self-help” into the separation-of-powers sphere. David E. Pozen, Self-Help
and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7, 8 (2014). He defined it as “any attempt to resolve another
branch’s wrongdoing in lieu of or prior to third-party dispute resolution.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 22 (focusing
definition on forms of self-help “that begin, and often end, outside the courts”).
7
See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 380, 420-21 (2015) (describing decisive shift to formalism under Roberts Court as manifestation of distrust of
other branches); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and Separation of
Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers
Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1615 (2012) (observing that Roberts Court has “eschewed functionalist
reasoning in favor of formalist analysis of separation of powers questions”).
8
566 U.S. 189 (2012).
9
See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016); Wellness
Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482-84 (2011); see
infra notes _ - _ and accompanying text.
10
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 538 (2013); see infra notes _ - _ and accompanying
text.
11
See Lucia v. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); see infra notes _ - _ and accompanying text.
12
140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
3
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subpoenas for the President’s financial documents, reaching the merits and setting ground rules
despite noting that coordinate branches had “managed for over two centuries to resolve such
disputes among themselves without the benefit of guidance from us.”13
In fielding separation-of-powers claims, the Court has preferred individual litigants to
institutional plaintiffs, even where individual interests and stakes are remote or derivative.14 In
Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission,15 a litigant subject to an SEC enforcement
proceeding challenged the appointment of his administrative law judge (ALJ), claiming that SEC
ALJs are “officers” who must be appointed by “Heads of Departments.”16 After determining
that the ALJs were in fact “officers,” the Court turned to the question of remedy.17 Recognizing
that the ALJ before whom Lucia had had his hearing could fairly readily obtain a constitutional
appointment from the SEC and would likely issue the same decision on rehearing,18 the Court
required that Lucia have a new hearing before a different ALJ in order to “create incentive[s] to
raise Appointments Clause challenges.”19 Without the prospect of such a bounty, the Court
assumed the individual would have insufficient skin in the game and no reason to advance the
legal claim. Lucia’s stark suggestion that individual plaintiffs are not, in fact, advancing their
own interests in these cases rests uncomfortably with the conventional understanding of injuryin-fact.20 In this area, the Court has relied without statutory authority on judicially-incentivized,
de facto private attorneys general, and that, too, is in tension with the Court’s precedents.21
The Roberts Court found itself in this conceptual jam because its predecessor, the
Rehnquist Court, had shut down most litigation avenues for the institutional actors whose
interests lurk in the background. After a majority of the Burger Court failed to coalesce around
the political question doctrine to dodge a dispute between President Carter and several Senators
in Goldwater v. Carter,22 Chief Justice Rehnquist switched tactics in Raines v. Byrd,23 which
adopted a constricted view of congressional standing and enshrined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
shut-it-down mood.24 Raines cast doubt upon any separation-of-powers suits by members of
Congress without express authorization from the entire chamber and left intact only a sliver of
13

Id. at 2031.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“In the precedents of this Court, the claims of
individuals – not of Government departments – have been the principal source of judicial decisions concerning
separation of powers and checks and balances.”).
15
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
16
Id. at 2047.
17
Id. at 2055.
18
During the pendency of the case, the SEC issued an order that “ratified its prior appointment” of the ALJs. See
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-215. Lucia challenged the validity of that ratification, but the Court found no reason to address it
because the SEC had not indicated that Lucia’s rehearing would be before an ALJ whose appointment depended on
it. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 n.6.
19
Id.at 2055 n.5.
20
See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 141 (2014) (describing
Court’s tacit recognition “that we should regard as fiction” the notion that an Appointments Clause case “was about
the rights of any particular litigant”).
21
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
22
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
23
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
24
See id. at 823.
14
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suits asserting institutional injury when members’ voting power is “held for naught.”25 Rejecting
the claim in Raines could have been easy – individual legislators had challenged a statute
enacted over their objection and thus sought to import a political tussle straight from the halls of
Congress into the judicial arena.26 The complained-of incursion on congressional authority in
Raines, in other words, was a congressional creation. In its haste to reject the challenge, the
Court wrote an opinion far broader than circumstance required and failed to distinguish amongst
different kinds of congressional claims and injuries. In so doing, the Court left Congress almost
completely incapable of appealing to the judiciary where its problem is not with its own
handiwork but with the actions of another branch.
The executive branch has more self-help options in the event of congressional
encroachment, so its role going to court as a turf-defending plaintiff in its own right has not been
conclusively established.27 If the executive finds that an act of Congress invades its
constitutional prerogatives, the President usually can either veto or, more controversially, refuse
to enforce it.28 But if the act of Congress is self-executing, like an administrative scheme that
trenches on the executive’s appointment authority, the executive branch has no such ability to
self-help. Individual litigants subject to coercive action – particularly if duly incentivized as in
Lucia – can serve to vindicate the executive’s authority in many cases. The protection offered by
individual litigants, though, is spotty; they can rarely serve as an alternative prospect in the
absence of coercive action, leaving some separation-of-powers claims without adequate
redress.29
One never writes on a blank slate in the justiciability area, and this particular “fragment”
has generated significant recent debate, with scholars all over the map in their approaches and
arguments.30 Preferring vindication by institutional actors, Professor Aziz Huq has argued that
individual plaintiffs should not have standing to “enforce a structural constitutional principle
redounding to the benefit of an official institution, [when] there is no reason the latter could not
enforce that interest itself.”31 He has expressly reserved the question whether the Court’s
precedents have in fact permitted institutional plaintiffs to sue,32 and this article both takes that
up and finds that the current understanding of case law in fact gives institutional actors too little
recourse. Likewise favoring a role for institutional plaintiffs, Professor Jamal Greene has
25

Id. at 823, 829-30. See Greene, supra note __, at 139 (observing that the Court has permitted congressional
standing “only in the narrow circumstances of an injury to a member’s personal rather than institutional interests”).
26
Id.at 814.
27
See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (2014) (“The Supreme
Court has never held that the executive has standing to assert an institutional interest in the enforcement of federal
law or, relatedly, in protecting any other duties or powers conferred by Article II.”).
28
See id. at 1327; see also Pozen, supra note __, at 22-23 (noting that most scholars believe the President’s refusal
to enforce an act she has not determined to be unconstitutional would violate the Take Care Clause).
29
Consider, for example, the various efforts to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the Federal
Open Market Committee, a key policy arm of the Federal Reserve System. See infra notes __ and accompanying
text.
30
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2015) (observing that
“[r]ecent years have witnessed the accelerated fragmentation of standing into a multitude of varied, complexly
related subdoctrines”).
31
Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1514 (2013).
32
Id. at 1440 n.16.
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advocated a statute or constitutional amendment conferring power on the Court, at the behest of
institutional actors, to adjudicate separation-of-powers disputes where the Constitution lays out a
rule.33 He has argued that “[d]ispute over the meaning of constitutional rules is . . . precisely the
context that least rewards patience in awaiting a plaintiff who has suffered individualized
harm.”34 This article agrees with Greene’s instincts and finds a reading of Raines and its
progeny that permits some suits by institutional actors to enforce constitutional rules under
existing law. Taking an opposing approach, Professor Kent Barnett has contended that
individual regulated parties should have standing to raise separation-of-powers claims, which he
likens to “procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its otherwise mandatory
desiderata.”35 He has argued that individual actors are superior to the political branches, which
often face partisan and policy-based distractions and impediments to suit.36 This article parts
company with Barnett on standing (in places) and demonstrates that there are some cases
individual actors cannot reliably bring. Professor Tara Leigh Grove has argued that the
enumerated powers granted to Congress and the executive in Articles I and II, respectively, do
not encompass the authority to bring suit to protect their turf – thus precluding any institutional
standing in this context – and that courts in any event ought to be skeptical of government
standing in order to avoid enmeshing the judiciary in battles more suited to the political arena.37
This article finds room in the Constitution for turf-protection and, though appreciating Grove’s
skepticism, contends that limited institutional standing is necessary for safeguarding our
constitutional structure, particularly in this polarized “Age of Dysfunction.”38
Whether it is a good or bad idea for the federal judiciary to leap into the fray and decide
complicated separation-of-powers questions, the Roberts Court has demonstrated enthusiasm for
the jumps, carving out a niche for itself in policing the boundaries of the three branches’
authority and opening its doors to, and even inviting, structural challenge. Reliance on
individuals to bring these questions before the Court gives rise to considerable problems; the
conceit of this article is that existing stumbling blocks to suits by institutional actors can be, and
in certain circumstances ought to be, overcome. Part I compares the Rehnquist and Roberts’
Courts approaches to the justiciability of conflicts between coordinate branches and
demonstrates that, while the Rehnquist Court shied away from such battles, the Roberts Court
has reclaimed a more confident role in determining boundaries in both garden-variety and more
nuanced turf disputes. Part II examines the Roberts Court’s reliance on individual claimants,
33

Greene, supra note __, at 146, 152.
Id. at 152.
35
Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 694 (2016). As discussed infra,
Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), may be read to cast doubt on the present viability of bare procedural
interests. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
36
See Barnett, supra note __, at 685.
37
See Grove, supra note __, at 1355-57 (arguing that neither Congress nor the executive has authority to sue for
institutional injuries); Tara Leigh Grove, Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2243, 2264
(2017) (observing that a central purpose of standing is to “ensur[e] that the courts do not become substitute forums
for matters that should be left to the political process”). See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and
the Fallacy of the Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (2019) (arguing against the concept of institutional
injury at all and claiming that institutional actors lack any interest in their institutional prerogatives).
38
Jonathan Zasloff coined this term, and it is perhaps even more apt now than when he described it in 2012. See
Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 479 (2012).
34
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born of necessity after Rehnquist-era Raines sharply curtailed institutional standing, and
demonstrates that dependence on individual litigants instead of institutional litigants to vindicate
separation-of-powers principles is difficult to square with principles of standing, relies on a
questionable private attorney general mechanism, and gives rise to gaps in the Court’s ability to
play its self-appointed part. Finally, in light of the problems presented by exclusive reliance on
individual plaintiffs, Part III revisits the question of institutional litigants. This part finds room
in existing case law for institutional standing where the gravamen of the claim is that an outside
actor is thwarting the exercise of institutional prerogatives set out in the Constitution.
I.

The Roberts Court’s Comparative Confidence in Adjudicating Boundary Disputes

Two related justiciability concepts surround the question of which actors are best-suited
(if indeed any are well-suited) to bring separation-of-powers questions into the federal courts, the
political question doctrine and standing. This section briefly touches upon each before tracing
how they have surfaced in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in the context of structural
litigation. As I will show, the Roberts Court has embraced a more expansive role for the federal
judiciary, despite the political question doctrine, without a corresponding reassessment of
standing concepts.
A. Diffuse Theoretical Underpinnings of the Political Question Doctrine
As is evident from its most recent outing in the political gerrymandering cases,39 the
political question doctrine often sharply divides both the Court and its audience and is by no
means in retreat. Chief Justice Marshall first staked out the Court’s role in limiting the other
branches to their enumerated powers in Marbury v. Madison,40 distinguishing between actions
that are susceptible of judicial resolution and those that are not.41 Where executive actors
proceed on matters properly within their discretion, “there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion.”42 The judiciary lacks any role, and “nothing can be more perfectly clear
than their acts are only politically examinable.”43 Conversely, where an institutional actor
exceeds that discretion, an injured party “has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy.”44 Marshall saw it as the judiciary’s province to determine whether an institutional actor
was acting intra vires or ultra vires and proceeded to do precisely that.45 Thus, in the course of
deciding Marbury’s right to the commission, the Court concluded both that Congress had
39

See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). In Rucho, a deeply divided Court held that the political
question doctrine precluded judicial consideration of political gerrymandering cases because of the absence of “legal
standards to limit and direct their decisions.” Id. at 2507.
40
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41
See id. at 166-67. See also Elizabeth Earle Beske, Political Question Disconnects, 67 AM. U. L. REV. FORUM 35,
37 (2019) (finding antecedents of the political question doctrine in Marbury).
42
Id. at 166. See also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866) (barring judicial review of a “purely
executive and political” presidential action).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See id. at 176. See also Barkow, supra note __, at 248-49 (noting that Marshall made clear “that it was for the
Court to determine whether an issue presented a political question, committed to the discretion of the political
branches, or a judicial question, which the Court could answer.”).
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exceeded its authority in conferring additional original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and
that federal courts had authority to issue writs of mandamus for executive actors who stepped out
of bounds.46
While Marbury provided logical underpinnings for the classical political question
doctrine, competing conceptions emerged over time. Professors Herbert Wechsler, a classicist,
and the Alexander Bickel, a prudentialist, famously debated whether the political question
doctrine ought to be invoked sparingly47 or employed whenever judges believed that expedience
and, particularly, concern for institutional legitimacy, might require it.48 The Court laid out six
factors in Baker v. Carr49 to guide invocation of the doctrine that confusingly combined features
of both views.50 At the same time, others questioned the need for the doctrine at all. Professor
Louis Henkin wrote an influential article entitled, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?,51 in
which he argued that situations deemed “nonjusticiable” simply involved on-the-merits
conclusions that the institutional actor was acting within the boundaries of its discretion.52 Put
differently, and in terms that might have resonated with Chief Justice Marshall, the Court had
adjudged that “[t]he act complained of violates no constitutional limitation on that power, either
because the Constitution imposes no relevant limitations, or because the action is amply within
the limits prescribed.”53

46

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch). at 166,
177. Professor Monaghan argues that Marbury entrenches a private rights model of adjudication, delimiting
constitutional boundaries only in the course of adjudicating individual rights. See Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1367 (1973). Certainly, cases like Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 77 (1867), substantiate this insight. In Stanton, the Court rejected the State of Georgia’s
challenge to enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts, deeming the questions “political” and noting pointedly that the
case did not involve the infringement of “private rights or private property.” Id. Professor Fallon finds support for a
“special function” model in Marbury as well, noting that Marbury’s conclusion that mandamus lies against federal
officers was a gratuitous pronouncement given the Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal
Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2003).
47
This is the Wechsler view. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1959).
48
This is the Bickelian counterargument. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term – Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961).
49
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The six factors are (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it”; (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made”; and (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.” Id.
50
See Barkow, supra note __, at 265 (classifying first and perhaps second factor as classical and factors three
through six as prudential). Scholars have sharply debated the nature and scope of the political question doctrine. See
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (2015); J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PENN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1988) (noting broad
disagreement over whether the doctrine exists at all or whether it exists but should not).
51
Louis Henkin, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
52
See id. at 601.
53
Id.
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Over the decades, the Court has vacillated in its embrace of its role as referee. ThenAssociate Justice Rehnquist, and later, the Rehnquist Court writ large, gravitated to a more
prudentialist view that federal courts ought to have a minimal role in navigating disputes among
branches to avoid the unseemliness of wading into an inter-branch dispute, while the Roberts
Court has reclaimed a more first-principles view that federal courts have a constitutionally
mandated role to play in delineating the outer boundaries of coordinate branch authority.54
B. The Elusive Standing Algorithm
The other justiciability concept interposing obstacles to adjudication in the separation-ofpowers context, standing, makes the political question doctrine look both simple and
uncontroversial.55 While all lawyers can recite the simple mantra that standing encompasses the
three requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, standing has justifiably been
described by observers as “incoherent,”56 a “mixture of complexity and lack of articulate
explanation,”57 “radically unsatisfying,”58 and a “word game played by secret rules.”59
“Standing” as a discrete concept is a newish creation. It is generally (though not
invariably) accepted that, before the twentieth century, standing doctrine barely existed.60 Most
54

See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
See Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 Georgetown L.J. 1191, 1195 (2014) (“[I]t is hard to find a scholarly
treatment of standing that does not remark upon the doctrine’s incoherence.”).
56
F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008); see also
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 228 (1990) (noting that courts and commentators “have
failed to formulate a coherent definition of article III’s case requirement); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or
Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1999) (lamenting that he cannot provide students “with a doctrinal algorithm
that they can use to predict judicial decisions with a reasonable degree of confidence”).
57
Fallon, supra note __, at 1063; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 238
(1988) (arguing that “standing determinations are actually determinations on the merits”).
58
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 BOSTON U. L. REV. 301, 304
(2002).
59
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60
See Richard H. Fallon et al., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 116 (7th ed.
2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992) (describing emergence of standing “as part and parcel
of the heated struggle, in the 1920s and 1930s, within the country and the courts about the constitutional legitimacy
of the emerging regulatory state”). See also Fallon, supra note __, at 1064 (“Through most of American legal
history, standing doctrine as we know it today – as a doctrine regulating who is a proper party to invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court to assert a legal claim or defense . . . – did not exist.”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra
note __, at 1009 (“There was no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century.”); Louis L. Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033,
1035 (1968) (noting that historical practice permitted the non-Hohfeldian, or ideological, plaintiff and did not
require a Hohfeldian plaintiff whose own rights and interests had been impaired); James E. Pfander, Standing,
Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 196-200 (2018)
(urging that nineteenth-century federal courts’ practice of fielding claims for noncontentious relief casts doubt on the
modern understanding of the case-or-controversy requirement, which treats “case” and “controversy” as functionally
identical); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 350
(describing standing as a creation of the New Deal that turned federal courts away from the public- and privateinterest models of the prior century) (1995). Cf. Re, supra note __, at 1220 (noting that, because it was not until the
twentieth century that nontraditional interests required adaptation of the traditional justiciability models, “modern
standing doctrine’s eighteenth century British pedigree (or lack thereof) is largely beside the point”). But see Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 712, 732-33 (2004)
55
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lawsuits involved either private litigants suing to vindicate private rights – generally those
recognized by the common law – or public officials vindicating public rights.61 Beginning with
the New Deal, three phenomena expanded the pool of potential plaintiffs with claims against the
government and put pressure on this system. First, the surge of statutes and regulations
accompanying the emergence of the administrative state gave rise to large numbers of people
with rights and interests not recognized at common law.62 Second, awareness of regulatory
capture led courts increasingly to recognize that regulatory beneficiaries and competitors, in
addition to regulatory targets, might have cognizable legal interests meriting protection.63
Finally, expansion of the protections of the Bill of Rights and their selective incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to bind the states led to an increase in
litigation to vindicate widely shared constitutional values.64 This was fine by the Warren Court,
and during the “generous sixties and seventies,” the Supreme Court “broadened dramatically the
category of who could challenge governmental action.”65
Standing doctrine emerged in reaction as pressures on the system, along with the
transition from Warren to Burger to Rehnquist Court, led the Court to adopt a more restrictive
view of its role in the process. The Court first coined the term “injury in fact” in a 1970 case that
broadened the pool of litigants, permitting suit so long as a plaintiff had suffered an “injury in

(contending that early American courts generally did not permit private plaintiffs to vindicate public rights and that
early, consistent concern for proper parties is an antecedent of modern standing doctrine).
61
See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008);
Fallon, supra note __, at 1065; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note __, at 712. Cf. Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the
Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (2009) (describing Court’s mid-twentieth-century acceptance of
congressionally-conferred standing on private litigants to vindicate the public interest); Stephen L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396 (1988) (describing private
attorney general model, in addition to private rights model, as a feature accepted at the time of the framers).
62
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note __, at 116-117; Fallon, supra note __, at 1065; Fletcher, supra note __, at
225.
63
See Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 703, 785 (2019)
(describing how appreciation for risks of agency capture made judicial review of agency action “more attractive to
liberals”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1047
(1997) (describing late-1960s loss of faith in agencies that was not accompanied by a loss of faith in activist
government, which led to greater role for courts); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-85 (1975) (noting agency critics’ settled concerns that agencies are beholden to
regulated interests at the expense of interests of “consumers, environmentalists, and the poor”); see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 289, 299-300 (2013) (describing abandonment of the “legal interest” test under the Warren Court in favor of
“newfangled,” more “abstract and generalized” injuries); Sunstein, supra note __, at 183-84 (describing how
perception of regulatory capture gave rise to notion that beneficiaries could suffer actionable legal harm through
regulatory nonfeasance); Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1443 (1988) (observing that the prospect of agency nonfeasance and regulatory capture gave rise to robust role for
judicial checks on administrative behavior). See generally Ass’n of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
155 (1970) (approving standing without an explicit statutory grant where litigant was “within the class of persons
that the statutory provision was designed to protect”).
64
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note __, at 116-117; Fallon, supra note __, at 1065; Hessick, supra note __, at
286-87; Fletcher, supra note __, at 225. See generally Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential
Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808, 828-29 (2018) (characterizing Warren Court’s activism as a shift in the Court’s
perception of the judicial function).
65
Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 G.W. L. REV. 718, 719 (1987).
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fact” that was “arguably . . . within the zone of interests” of a regulatory statute.66 Two years
later, Sierra Club v. Morton67 clarified that, even if plaintiff was within this zone of statutory
interests, “the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury” so as to preclude
“judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than
vindicate their own value preferences.”68 On its heels came Warth v. Seldin,69 which expressly
grounded the new injury-in-fact element in Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement70 and
emphasized the additional elements of causation and redressability.71
Development of standing’s intellectual underpinnings followed. In 1983, then-Judge
Antonin Scalia published an essay that connected robust enforcement of the standing
requirement under Article III to the separation of powers.72 Scalia’s central thesis was that
standing restricts the unelected federal judiciary to its “undemocratic” role of protecting
individuals from injury at the behest of elected majorities and precludes it from the “even more
undemocratic” role of venturing into the political process.73 Where plaintiff’s injury is widely
shared and not unique, Scalia contended, his sole recourse is to persuade like-minded actors to
vote for his cause through ordinary political means.74
The Court embraced a separation-of-powers rationale for standing in Allen v. Wright75
and adopted Scalia’s vision wholesale in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.76 In Allen, the Court
noted that “the idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine” prevents courts
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53. Data Processing was the first case to employ “injury in fact” in the
standing context. See Magill, supra note __, at 129. Sunstein unsparingly criticizes Data Processing for leaving
“obscure” standing’s connection to Article III and for inadequately explaining and grounding its approach. See
Sunstein, supra note __, at 186. Although the case supplied the now-familiar restrictive element with a name, the
zone of interests test initially expanded the ranks of plaintiffs eligible to file suit. See Hessick, supra note __, at
294-95; Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note __, at 1010; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 888-89 (1983). Caleb Nelson has argued that Data
Processing is widely misunderstood to confer remedial rights on anyone who satisfies the Court’s test; he argues
instead that the loose standard articulated by the Court was a preliminary screening mechanism that was distinct
from “the merits”—that is, whether plaintiff had a cause action. See Nelson, supra note __, at 709-10, 763.
67
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
68
Id. at 738, 740.
69
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
70
See id. at 498-99.
71
See id. at 505-07. Under Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, it is canonically accepted that federal
courts resolve abstract legal questions only as a “necessary byproduct” of actual disputes between two parties See
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93
HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1366 (1973) (noting that the Court’s opinions reflect the idea that “judicial intervention should
occur only when unavoidably necessary”).
72
Scalia, supra note __, at 894-97. For an analysis of Justice Scalia’s imprint on standing doctrine, see generally
James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 85
(2017). Pfander finds that, while he lost a few skirmishes, Justice Scalia “broadly succeeded in re-making the law of
standing along the lines sketched in his 1983 essay.” Id. at 98. Pfander notes that Scalia found little textual hook for
his standing concept, anchoring it in Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement “(for want of a better vehicle),”
and made little effort to justify his conception of standing by reference to historical practice. See id. at 90.
73
Id. at 894.
74
See id.
75
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
76
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
66
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from acting as “virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.”77 In Lujan, the Court denied standing to environmental groups suing under the
Endangered Species Act’s citizen suit provision, again announcing that the courts would not
litigate “the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law.”78
The Court reminded that, notwithstanding congressional authorization, the Constitution required
that plaintiffs’ claimed injury be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”79
Individual cases over the next decades revealed great rifts in the Justices’ approaches to
standing, particularly where widely shared grievances are concerned. In FEC v. Akins,80 the
Court held that a group of voters had standing to challenge the FEC’s determination that the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a “political committee” required to
make membership and financial disclosures.81 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, found that
“the fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely shared . .
. does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”82 Justice Scalia
dissented bitterly, complaining that Akins’ injury was undifferentiated from that of any other
voter.83 In Massachusetts v. EPA, a 5-4 Court approved standing for Massachusetts as owner of
coastal property to challenge the EPA’s “abdication” of enforcement authority under the Clean
Air Act.84 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the threatened injury, global warming,
“may ultimately affect nearly everyone on the planet,” and its very concept “seems inconsistent
with [the] particularization requirement.”85

468 U.S. at 759-60; see also id. at 752 (stating that standing “is built on a single basic idea – the idea of separation
of powers”). As subsequent cases would reflect, the “single basic idea” of separation of powers proved elusive as
the Justices appeared to embrace varying ideas about what it entailed. See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions
of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008) (identifying three separate and distinct separation-of-powers rationales
underlying standing and arguing that existing doctrine serves none of them well). Elliott recounts that standing is
variously justified as [1] promoting concrete adversity between litigants with a personal stake in the case, [2]
diverting from the courts cases involving generalized grievances better resolved through the political system, and [3]
protecting the executive branch against incursions on its authority to enforce the law. See id. at 468.
78
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
79
Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
80
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
81
See id. at 13.
82
Id. at 24.
83
See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84
549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007).
85
Id. at 535, 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Professor Richard Fallon has noted standing’s “accelerated
fragmentation . . . into a multitude of varied, complexly related subdoctrines.” Fallon, supra note __, at 1061.
Judge Fletcher has described standing as “a set of loosely linked proto-doctrines.” William A. Fletcher, Standing:
Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 278 (2013). Professor Richard Re has intriguingly
argued that many of these disparate results can be rationalized under the construct of relative standing. See
generally Re, supra note __. Re notes that the Court frequently loosens the requirements of standing where no
superior plaintiffs exist to the party before the court and raises the bar where the plaintiff, though injured, has an
inferior claim to that of other parties. See, e.g., id. at 1224 (noting that the Court approved standing for a white
defendant to challenge a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons because no other
party was better situated to raise the claim).
77
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Most recently, the Court has strengthened its supervision over Congress’s ability to create
rights, the violation of which gives rise to injury in fact. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins86 and
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,87 the Court evaluated claimed violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, which requires consumer reporting agencies to employ “reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports and authorizes liability
for willful failure to comply.88 Spokeo found that, despite the broad citizen suit provision, legally
sufficient injury – either tangible or intangible – must “actually exist.”89 The Court remanded
plaintiff’s claim that an online information aggregator had published inaccurate information
about him in violation of the Act so the Ninth Circuit could ponder whether his injury,
concededly particularized, was also “concrete.”90 Not all errors, the Court reasoned, were “real”
harm; a misprinted zip code, for example, was almost surely insufficient to support a federal
lawsuit.91 Spokeo reaffirmed that a plaintiff must come forward with a high likelihood of
something that looks like harm-in-the-harmful sense, even where his injury is unique to him and
even where Congress has broadly authorized the suit. TransUnion entrenched this judicial
supervision. In TransUnion, the Court reaffirmed Spokeo’s holding and approach, holding that a
class of litigants whom creditors had erroneously told third parties were on a terror watchlist had
standing to sue, while those whose status had not been disclosed to third parties could not.92
Spokeo and TransUnion offer an approach to the identification of harm that places the
judiciary in the driver’s seat.93 At issue were intangible injuries, not good, old-fashioned
physical and economic harms.94 To assess whether statutory violations give rise to concrete
harm, the Court instructed that lower courts should first look to historical analogues, as harms
that have traditionally been understood to supply a basis for a lawsuit at common law are likely
concrete.95 Second, the court should tip its hat, but not defer, to the judgment of Congress, for its
views are “instructive and important.”96 Finally, the Court’s ipse dixit about the harmlessness of
86

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
88
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), n(a).
89
136 S. Ct. at 1548.
90
Id. at 1548-49.
91
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. Commentators have criticized the conclusion that a misprinted zip code inflicts
no injury. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 233. 241-42 (2017) (citing
studies that an erroneous zip code can affect job prospects, access to credit, insurance rates, and voter eligibility).
92
See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. 2208-10 (2021).
93
Elsewhere, I have heavily criticized this approach. See generally Elizabeth Earle Beske, Charting a Course Past
Spokeo and TransUnion, 29 GEO. MASON L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022).
94
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. See also Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2285, 2325 (2018) (“The tangible/intangible distinction, thus understood, creates two tiers of harm: one
category of ‘obvious’ harm and one category of harm, the reality of which requires a more complex inquiry.”).
Bayefsky aptly criticizes this tidy dichotomy by noting that physical and economic harms have not invariably given
rise to an actionable claim in the past. See id. at 2327-29. For an in-depth and critical discussion of Spokeo, see
William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 226-27 (2017) (concluding that the
Court’s effort to “identify the subset of statutory rights that vaguely resemble the common law” is “a misstep”).
95
See id. The Court cited by way of example the Vermont Agency case approving of standing for qui tam plaintiffs,
which relied in part on the device’s 700-year-old pedigree. See id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-77 (2000)).
96
Id. The Court left the status of purely procedural rights in some doubt, reaffirming that Congress has the ability to
create new rights, violations of which may give rise to standing, but qualifying that these must be connected to a risk
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zip code errors suggests a considerable role for common sense.97 The TransUnion Court
doubled down, again directing courts to compare novel assertions of intangible injury to common
law analogues and, in its application, concluding that some deviations from the common law
might give rise to actionable harm,98 while others surely would not.99 The Court offered no
guiding principle by which to distinguish actionable from nonactionable harm, thus again vesting
the lower courts with considerable judicial discretion in policing boundaries. Rather than
rationalizing and clarifying a doctrine already subject to criticism, then, the Court’s most recent
moves have engendered more confusion, as several lower court judges lamented post-Spokeo.100
C. Justiciability, Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court
We are left with two different doctrines, each of which is subject to criticism, each of
which has over time enjoyed varying reception and diverse justifications, and each of which can
be deployed to keep certain disputes out of the federal courts. Associate and then Chief Justice
Rehnquist was very wary of a role for federal courts in the adjudication of disputes where
coordinate branches were feature players, and he deployed, or attempted to deploy, both the
political question doctrine and standing in order to circumscribe institutional players’ authority to
bring such cases. A product of the Watergate era,101 Rehnquist embraced a prudential approach
that focused on the unseemliness of federal courts jumping into the fray.102 In the Burger Court,
Rehnquist’s view that the federal courts ought to stand down and let vying branches work it out

of underlying harm. That harm, presumably, is harm-in-the-traditional sense. See id. This now-required nexus
between a prophylactic procedural right and the risk of more conventional harm it seeks to prevent will narrow the
category of actionable procedural rights and may give rise to a more robust redressability inquiry in the procedural
context going forward. Cf. Barnett, supra note __, at 694-96 (arguing, pre-Spokeo, that individual standing to bring
separation-of-powers claims is analogous to “procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its
otherwise mandatory desiderata”).
97
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. See also Yeager v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1217
(M.D. Ala. 2017) (noting role of common sense in Spokeo inquiry and surmising “one should not be distracted by
minnows when the aim of the statute is trout”).
98
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2209 (2021) (rejecting TransUnion’s argument that plaintiffs
had not suffered actionable harm because the inclusion of their names on the terror watchlist was “not literally
false,” even though falsity was a key requirement of common-law defamation).
99
See id. at 2209-10 (concluding that plaintiffs who could not establish disclosure of their watchlist status to third
parties could not establish actionable harm because “[p]ublication is essential to liability” in a common-law
defamation suit).
100
See, e.g., Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1121 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring)
(arguing, after Spokeo, that “our current Article III standing doctrine can’t be correct—as a matter of text, history, or
logic”); Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
dissenting) (noting “how far standing doctrine has drifted from its beginnings and from constitutional first
principles”).
101
Rehnquist served as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in the Nixon Administration from
January 1969 to October 1971. Joan Biskupic described Rehnquist as a “political insider whose service in the Nixon
White House helped shape his hard-right outlook.” Joan Biskupic, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 46 (2019).
102
Judge Bybee and Tuan Samahon have likened Rehnquist’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence to the riddle of the
Sphinx, “a difficult creature to characterize, arguably evolving over time” and culminating in a late stage that lacked
any unifying principle. Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the Separation of Powers, and the
Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006).
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through the political process initially failed to gain traction.103 Over time, though, and as
personnel changed, Rehnquist’s views found a steady cohort.104
a. Political Question Cases in the Rehnquist Era
Associate Justice Rehnquist joined a Court in 1972 that was relatively comfortable
navigating interbranch disputes. In the waning days of the Warren Court, before Rehnquist’s
tenure, the Court’s first brush with the political question doctrine in a case involving the actions
of a coordinate branch rejected application of the doctrine to preclude a judicial role.105 Adam
Clayton Powell, elected to Congress, challenged the House’s refusal to allow him to take his seat
due to alleged financial improprieties.106 The House had asserted the authority of each house of
Congress to “Judge the . . . Qualifications of its own Members.”107 The district court108 and the
court of appeals109 invoked the political question doctrine to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court reversed in a 7-1 decision.110 Carefully examining English precedent,
records of the convention, and post-ratification history, the Court concluded that the Constitution
authorized the House to judge only those qualifications that it specifically enumerated in Article
I, section 2 and did not confer on Congress discretion to exclude a member for any other
reason.111 While Powell took the six Baker v. Carr factors as its point of departure, the opinion
devoted over thirty pages to analysis of whether the Constitution had committed the matter to
congressional discretion112 and relegated the more prudential, Bickelian factors to a scant two
paragraphs under the subheading, “Other Considerations.”113 The Court firmly rejected the
Speaker’s contention that it ought to stay its hand because judicial resolution would “produce ‘a
potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches’ of the Federal
Government.”114 Its decision “require[d] no more than an interpretation of the Constitution.”115
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See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Then
Associate-Justice Rehnquist commanded three votes in Goldwater, not the four additional votes he needed. See
infra notes __ and accompanying text.
104
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
105
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
106
See id. at 490.
107
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
108
Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 359-60 (D.D.C. 1967).
109
Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 593-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
110
Powell, 395 U.S. at 549-50. Justice Abe Fortas, himself embroiled in scandal, did not participate in the case and
resigned the month before it issued. See Justice’s Resignation First Under Impeachment Threat, in CQ ALMANAC
1969, at 136-37 (25th ed., 1970), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal69-1247815.
111
See id. at 550.
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See id. at 518-548.
113
Id. at 548-49. This led some commentators to opine that the prudential factors had receded in importance. See
Barkow, supra note __, at 269 (observing that “[p]rudential factors had no bearing on the Court’s decision,” which
left “some to question whether that strand of the doctrine had died completely”); Tushnet, supra note __, at 1213
n.51 (noting that “it would not have been difficult to say that deciding the merits of the question presented in Powell
v. McCormack would express a lack of respect for the House of Representatives, and yet the Court did not do so”).
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Powell, 396 U.S. at 548.
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Id.
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A divided Burger Court muddied these waters in Goldwater v. Carter,116 in which thenAssociate Justice Rehnquist articulated a starkly different view of the judicial function. In 1978,
President Carter announced that the United States would recognize the People’s Republic of
China as the sole government of China and withdraw from its Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan.117 Senator Barry Goldwater and fourteen other members of Congress filed suit in
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the President from terminating
the treaty without congressional consent.118 The district court ruled that the President could not
unilaterally terminate a treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of
both houses of Congress.119 The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.120 Like the district court,
the en banc majority found the matter justiciable, but it concluded that the Constitution did not
require the President to involve Congress in the withdrawal from a treaty.121 The Supreme Court
vacated the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in a terse, two-sentence order and remanded to the district
court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.122 In the accompanying separate opinions, the
Court split 4-4 on whether the case presented a political question.123
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion for himself and three colleagues
expressing the view that the case was “political,” and thus “nonjusticiable, because it involve[d]
the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to
which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.”124 He made
much of the Constitution’s silence regarding treaty abrogation and found that, where the
Constitution did not spell the answer out, the judiciary lacked manageable standards.125 He saw
no special role for the Court to “settle a dispute between coequal branches of our Government,
each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests.”126 Although Rehnquist
found no fifth vote, his vision of the political question doctrine and the judicial role deviated
sharply from the confident approach taken in Powell. Two coordinate branches had squared off
over whether the Constitution permitted one of them to act without involving the other, and
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444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
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See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979)
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court”). See generally Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 242-43
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444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979).
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See id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Rehnquist, with three colleagues, was prepared to throw up his hands and declare the federal
judiciary powerless to resolve the dispute.127
He faced formidable counterargument. On the other side, Justice Powell128 sharply denied
the case involved a nonjusticiable political question.129 Powell argued that the case “concern[ed]
only the constitutional division of power between Congress and the President” and “only
requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation.”130 He pointed to other separation-ofpowers cases, like Powell, in which the Court had manifested “willingness . . . to decide whether
one branch of our Government has impinged upon the power of another” and saw no reason to
deviate from that course.131 That the Constitution’s text did not clearly resolve the matter was of
no moment; it was the Court’s role to engage in “interstitial” analysis, an ordinary method of
constitutional interpretation.132 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented on the
grounds that he wanted to hear the case, thus agreeing that the case was justiciable.133 Justice
Brennan, in dissent, charged Justice Rehnquist with “profoundly misapprehend[ing]” the
political question doctrine, which had no application to “the antecedent question whether a
particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of political
decisionmaking power.”134
Although Rehnquist’s Goldwater rallying cry lost traction over the next couple of
cases, he was able to set aside this role of boundary cop, writing as Chief, in Nixon v. United
135

Professor Harlan Cohen colorfully noted that Rehnquist “scrunch[ed] all six [of the Baker factors] into a ball,
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States.136 In Nixon, the Court held that the political question doctrine precluded jurisdiction over
a challenge to the Senate’s impeachment proceedings of a federal judge.137 Admittedly, Nixon
was “perhaps the most powerful case” for application of the doctrine given the involvement of a
federal judge,138 and the result was unanimous. Walter Nixon, convicted of bribery, filed suit in
federal court challenging a Senate rule that permitted a Senate committee, rather than the full
Senate, to hold evidentiary hearings in his impeachment trial.139 Nixon argued that the Senate
rule violated the Senate’s obligation under Article I, section 3 to “try” all impeachments.140 The
Court’s various opinions reflected sharp divisions on the approach to the political question
doctrine, but significantly, the Chief again favored the most limited-to-nonexistent role for
federal courts. He concluded that the Constitution had given the Senate “sole” power to try
impeachments, the word “try” was too vague to give rise to judicially manageable standards, and
judicial involvement of any kind in impeachment proceedings was inconsistent with the
constitutional scheme.141 Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, sought to reserve a role for
the judiciary in the event the Senate exceeded its discretion, for example by adjudicating
impeachments via coin toss.142 The Chief’s opinion removed the topic completely from the
judicial purview, rejecting even that outer boundary patrol role. Nixon was the Rehnquist
Court’s last pronouncement on the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine under the Rehnquist Court reflects a steady push and pull
amongst its members between the belief in a Court singularly suited to patrol the outer
boundaries of coordinate branch power and the far more reticent view, championed by Rehnquist
himself, that coordinate branches are best left to their own devices. Rehnquist’s proffered
Goldwater approach signaled his belief that, where the Constitution itself provides no clear
answer, the judiciary is ill-suited to step into the fray. That view commanded insufficient votes
in 1979, but by 1993, the idea that, at least in certain cases, the judiciary ought to have no role in
delineating the outermost boundaries of congressional authority – even in the face of Justice
Souter’s hypothesized dereliction of constitutional duty – found an additional five. The Court’s
enthusiasm for playing the role as arbiter-in-chief, delineator of lines, left the nineties in some
doubt, and lower courts took heed. After Nixon, the Supreme Court avoided the political question
doctrine altogether for nearly two decades, rejecting petitions for certiorari even as lower courts
increasingly invoked it.143

mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require
that the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy. . . .”)
136
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
137
See id. at 237-38.
138
Barkow, supra note __, at 273.
139
See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227-28.
140
See id. at 228.
141
See id. at 229-35. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote an opinion reminiscent of the Henkin
approach. He would have reached the merits but concluded that the Senate had not exceeded its constitutionallyconferred discretion in trying Nixon. See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
142
See id. at 253-54 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
143
See, e.g., Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that
political question doctrine precluded a serviceman’s suit against a private business for injuries sustained on base);
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1178 (2011)
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b. Standing in Separation-of-Powers Cases
The Rehnquist Court’s one and only direct pronouncement on institutional standing,
Raines v. Byrd,144 was a doozy, and it continues to reverberate and shape the landscape today.
Understanding Raines requires some context.
The Court first encountered legislative standing in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller.145 Raines
begrudgingly preserved Coleman,146 so it is an important first piece of the puzzle. In Coleman,
the Kansas senate had split 20-20 on a vote to ratify the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.147 The lieutenant governor had provided a tie-breaking vote to ratify the
amendment, and the twenty senators who had voted against ratification filed suit in state court
challenging the lieutenant governor’s right to participate.148 The state supreme court upheld the
tie-breaking vote, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.149 The Court found the
senators had standing because their votes “would have been sufficient to defeat ratification,” and,
having not led to that defeat, thus had been “held for naught.”150 The Court determined that the
(invoking political question doctrine to avoid resolving Federal Tort Claims case after bombing of Sudanese
factory); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1262-1264 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206
(2007) (holding that political question doctrine precludes claims against United States for support of 1970 Chilean
coup); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (using
political question doctrine to avoid resolving claim relating to depopulation of island to create Diego Garcia military
base); Custer Cty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2002) (applying political question doctrine to preclude plaintiffs’ challenge to the Colorado Airspace Initiative);
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001)
(invoking political question doctrine to avoid deciding what is a “treaty” requiring Senate ratification); New Jersey
v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1996) (using political question doctrine to avoid resolving state to
recover costs incurred in educating and incarcerating illegal immigrants). See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925 (2015) (observing that lower
courts “have applied this doctrine especially generously, even in the context of statutory interpretation and
international law”); Mulhern, supra note __, at 106-07 (noting that lower courts have invoked the doctrine to avoid
resolving divisive issues and that the Supreme Court avoided entering the fray by denying certiorari).
144
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
145
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
146
See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823-24.
147
See id. at 436.
148
See id.
149
See id. at 437. The “Opinion of the Court” of Chief Justice Hughes commanded only two votes and rejected the
state senators’ lawsuit on other grounds. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in
which he, joined by three justices, contended that the state legislators lacked standing. See id. at 469-70 (Opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). Because the portion of Coleman addressing standing did not command a majority, one
commentator opined that “Coleman’s authority as precedent for modern congressional standing cases is
problematic.” R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway? 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1986). Subsequent to Dessem’s article, the Supreme Court put Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion
on more solid footing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 822 (1997), and again in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.13 (2015).
150
Id. at 438. Tara Leigh Grove has argued a different interpretation of Coleman. See Tara Leigh Grove,
Government Standing, supra note __. Noting that the institutional plaintiffs filed their case in state court, she says
“Coleman should be understood as a case in which the Supreme Court applied a now-outdated rule of appellate
standing to hear a federal constitutional challenge from a state court.” Id. at 651. Grove cites Frankfurter’s
concurring opinion, in which he contends that the state legislators would not have had Article III standing in state
court and thus should not have had standing on appeal and claims that he articulated what would become the modern
rule. See id. at 654-55; see also William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court
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senators’ interest in “maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” was “plain, direct and
adequate”151 and that the case was no “mere intra-parliamentary controversy.”152 Subsequent
courts have invoked aspects of Coleman to various ends, so there are several features worth
noting. First, the votes at issue actually had been cast and the lieutenant governor’s vote voided
them entirely.153 Second, the senate itself did not sue in an institutional capacity. Third, all
twenty affected senators sued, and their collected votes, if counted and not subject to the tie
break, would have changed the outcome.154 Finally, the twenty senators’ dispute was not with
fellow legislators but with the action of an executive actor.155 The case thus was not an effort to
export an intra-senate dispute into the judicial branch.
The Supreme Court’s initial encounters with congressional standing after Coleman
generally found legislator standing unproblematic. The Court saw no justiciability impediment
in Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s challenge to the House resolution denying him a seat, which is
unsurprising given Powell’s obvious claim to individual, not institutional, harm.156 In Buckley v.
Valeo,157 plaintiffs challenging the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 included a
presidential candidate, a sitting U.S. Senator, a potential contributor, and several state parties.158
Without elaboration, the Court satisfied itself that “at least some of” them had standing, citing
Coleman amongst other cases.159 As focused as it was on the justiciability question in Goldwater

Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 275-76 (1990) (claiming that Frankfurter’s Coleman
concurrence established the principle that the Supreme Court is bound by Article III even when it fields appeals
from state courts that are not). There is definitely room for Grove’s argument given the Hughes majority’s contrast
between Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), where the Court reviewed on appeal from state court a challenge to
the ratification of an amendment, and Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), where the Court refused to review a
New York voter’s federal challenge to ratification of an amendment on the basis that he asserted only a generalized
grievance. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 440-41. However, Hughes also was at pains to note that the senators had a “plain,
direct, and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,” id. at 438, and he observed that this
interest was more “impressive” than the interests of the litigants in Leser. Id. at 441. Whether or not Leser meant
ability to sue in state court automatically conferred standing on appeal to the Supreme Court, then, the Hughes
majority arguably found an interest sufficient to satisfy Article III in the invalidation of the senators’ votes. See
generally John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J. L. & POL. 103, 122 n.
73 (2015) (noting that at time of Coleman, “as now, the Court was not always rigorous in distinguishing between
constitutional limits on jurisdiction, statutory limits on jurisdiction, and causes of action”).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 441.
153
See id. at 438.
154
See id. Matthew Hall has argued that, any one of these senators was deprived of the right to have his vote
counted and thus even a single senator should have had standing. See Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative
Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2016). As explained infra, requiring an outcome-determinative number of
participants minimizes the risk of interference in the political process.
155
See id. at 436.
156
395 U.S. 486, 517, 547-48 (1969) (concluding that Powell had sought appropriate relief and that the political
question doctrine did not preclude review). See also Hall, supra note __, at 24-25 (characterizing Powell as a
conventional individual standing case).
157
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
158
See id. at 7-8.
159
Id. at 12 & n.10. That the Court cited Coleman at least suggests that the presence of legislators reinforced the
claim to standing, but it does not prove it outright.
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v. Carter, the Court did not consider standing.160 In INS v. Chadha,161 the Court found that the
intervention of the two Houses of Congress as “adverse parties” helped render the dispute
justiciable given the INS’s agreement with Mr. Chadha that the legislative veto provision was
unconstitutional.162 In Bowsher v. Synar,163 the presence of the National Treasury Employees
Union, whose standing on behalf of its members was uncontroversial, allowed the Court to
bypass the question whether members of Congress also had standing to challenge the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.164
Raines v. Byrd165 represented the Supreme Court’s first direct reencounter with legislative
standing since 1939. Raines involved a challenge by six members of Congress to the Line Item
Veto Act,166 which enabled the President to “cancel” a spending and tax benefit measure after
signing it into law if the President determined that doing so would reduce the federal budget
deficit without impairing the national interest.167 Plaintiffs, four Senators and two members of
the House who had voted against the bill, filed suit the day after its passage in district court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the line-item veto violated Article I of the
Constitution.168 The district court found their claim of diluted voting power sufficient to confer

See McGowan, supra note __, at 256 (observing that the Supreme Court “made no use of the term” standing in
its decision, which the author thought suggested that use of standing as a mechanism for judicial restraint “may have
passed insofar as these lawsuits are concerned”).
161
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
162
See id. at 930-31 & n.6.
163
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
164
See id. at 721. The D.C. Circuit faced the lion’s share of suits by members of Congress in the 1970s and 1980s
and spent two decades shaping an approach without intervention from on high. The court extended the definition of
injury beyond the vote cancellation recognized in Coleman to process-based defects and initially held even that
individual legislators could have standing to raise institutional claims. In Kennedy v. Sampson, Senator Kennedy
filed suit against the Administrator of the General Services Administration seeking a declaration that President
Nixon’s attempted pocket veto of a bill had not been effective. 511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court
rejected the claim that only Congress as a whole, or one of its houses, had standing to challenge the President’s
action. See id. at 435. The court found sufficient interest to confer standing in the fact that, if the pocket veto was
valid, the Senator’s prior vote for the bill had lost its effect without giving him the opportunity to override a
conventional veto. See id. The D.C. Circuit struggled where the congressional claimant’s issue was primarily with
his legislative colleagues, initially denying standing and over time finding standing but invoking equitable discretion
to withhold declaratory relief. In Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
the court found that a senator had alleged injury-in-fact in his inability to provide advice and consent in an
appointment where the methods for appointment were creatures of statute. See id. at 878-79. After finding standing,
though, the court invoked equitable discretion to withhold relief because the plaintiff had ample means of legislative
redress. See id. at 882. The D.C. Circuit’s inquiry thus conferred standing on individual members of Congress for
injuries to their institutional prerogatives but actually allowed suit to proceed only where plaintiff’s problem had its
origins outside of Congress. See, e.g., Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding standing and
refusing to exercise equitable discretion to dismiss where members of Congress challenged actions of the D.C.
Council that deprived them of the right to review an act before it took effect, in alleged contravention of the Home
Rule Act). The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the Kennedy holding, and refused to exercise equitable discretion, in Barnes
v. Kline. See 795 F.2d 21, 26-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
165
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
166
See id. at 814.
167
See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a).
168
See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
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standing and held that the act violated Article I.169 The Supreme Court took the direct, expedited
appeal prescribed by the Act and issued an opinion within thirty days.170
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected standing in the
broadest possible strokes. The Court distinguished Powell v. McCormack as a case involving a
representative personally “singled out for specially unfavorable treatment.”171 In Raines, instead,
the plaintiffs raised a claim that “runs (in a sense) with the Member’s seat,”172 involved no
private rights, and was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed.”173 The Court conceded it had
recognized an “institutional injury” in Coleman but found that case readily distinguishable.174
Coleman applied to situations where “legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to
defeat (or enact) a specific legislative act . . . sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or
does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”175 The
Raines plaintiffs had simply voted and lost the battle, and the Court was unwilling to extend
Coleman to encompass abstract claims of diluted legislative power.176 The Court buttressed its
decision not to extend Coleman with history, noting that major separation-of-powers battles in
the late 1860s had taken place outside the judicial arena.177 Without further explanation, the
Court cryptically “attach[ed] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized
to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action.”178 Finally, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs had political remedies and that its decision did not foreclose challenge by an
individual who suffered particularized injury by operation of the act.179
Commentators received Raines as a near-shutdown of congressional standing, except in
situations that mirrored the Coleman or Powell facts or, perhaps, in cases where the entire House

See id. at 817. Inasmuch as the injury was inflicted by a statute, the district court’s holding violated the thenprevailing D.C. Circuit approach.
170
See id. at 817-18.
171
Id. at 821.
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Id.
173
Id. at 829.
174
See id. at 824.
175
Id. at 823.
176
See id. at 826.
177
See id. at 826-27. That President Andrew Johnson did not resort to federal court to challenge the Tenure of
Office Act, of course, was quite possibly a function of the absence of general federal question jurisdiction in 1868.
Aside from a brief and quickly-retracted dalliance with federal question jurisdiction in the Midnight Judges Act,
enacted after the contentious election of 1800, Congress did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the
federal courts until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
463-64 & n.14 (1974) (observing that the Act of 1875 conferred federal question jurisdiction upon lower federal
courts “for but the second time in their nearly century-old history”).
178
Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
179
See id. at 829-30. The near-certainty that a beneficiary of a spending provision “vetoed” by the President would
be forthcoming undoubtedly affected the Court’s analysis. The opportunity to resolve the issue arrived the next year
with Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Raines thus is a nice example of what Richard Re has called
“relative standing”: given the likelihood that a better plaintiff would emerge, the Court had no need to dignify the
asserted institutional injury. See Re, supra note __, at 1214-15 (suggesting that, instead of disclaiming injury, the
courts ought to view the right to sue as a “scarce resource” and ought to turn away some putative plaintiffs where
others, with “weightier” interests, would likely emerge).
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or Senate had authorized suit.180 That Raines achieved by different means precisely what
Rehnquist had intended in Goldwater was no accident; Raines was “informed – and indeed
virtually controlled – by political question concerns.”181 The D.C. Circuit took heed.182 In its
first post-Raines case, Chenoweth v. Clinton,183 the court confronted a suit filed by several
members of Congress challenging the President’s implementation of an environmental program
by executive order on the basis that it deprived them of their right to debate and vote on the
initiative by legislation.184 Because the plaintiffs’ primary gripe was with the actions of the
President, not their colleagues, the case would have proceeded pre-Raines.185 The post-Raines
panel found that the case did not mirror Coleman facts, and the D.C. Circuit dismissed for want
of standing.186
In Goldwater, in the political question doctrine context, and Raines, in the standing
context, it is possible to find lines of commonality and consistency in the approach of William
Rehnquist to disputes amongst coordinate branches. While individually harmed actors, like
Powell and Chadha, could find their way into federal court, the institutional actors themselves
were relegated to their political remedies. Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist fell short of
persuading the necessary number of colleagues in Goldwater, and thereafter set the political
question doctrine aside until Nixon, when he articulated a conception of the doctrine that
disclaimed a role for the judiciary even in the outlandish case. In Raines, he found his move, and
180

See, e.g., 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11.2 (3d ed. 2008)
(stating that limits imposed by Raines, “drawn from separation-of-powers concerns that mimic political-question
doctrine, may well preclude such standing entirely”); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional
Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 342 (2015) (noting that Raines broadly suggested “that congressional standing
may be quite constrained”); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Restraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2013) (observing that, since Raines, courts “typically find
individual members lack standing”); Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of
Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1752 (1999) (stating that Raines would at most allow standing on
Coleman facts or if either or both houses of Congress sued as an institution or specifically authorized members to
sue); see also Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme
Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 354 (1997) (describing “the Court’s
characterization of congressional standing as an invitation to interbranch Armageddon”).
181
Wright et al., supra note _, at § 3531.11.2; see also James A. Turner, Comment, The Post-Medellin Case for
Legislative Standing, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 753 (2010) (observing that, while Raines did not address the political
question doctrine, “part of the reason the Court rejected standing for the legislators was because of the political
nature of their claim”); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 49
(2016) (noting that the Raines Court borrowed heavily from political question jurisprudence and that the opinion
shows that “denial of standing can perform political question’s function of diverting plaintiffs to the legislative
arena”). Lower courts have linked Raines and Goldwater in denying legislative suits. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush,
236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting legislators’ challenge to President Bush’s unilateral withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because they lacked standing under Raines and the issue presented a political
question under Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Goldwater).
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Some commentators assumed that the Supreme Court used Raines to “send a message to the D.C. Circuit.” See
Devins & Fitts, supra note _, at 361.
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181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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See id. at 113.
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The court noted that Congress had the power prospectively to terminate the program if it was so inclined and thus
concluded that the issue was susceptible of political resolution. See id. at 116. Pre-Raines, the D.C. Circuit would
probably have fielded Chenoweth on the merits.
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See id. at 117.
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in broad strokes, borrowing heavily from his own political question jurisprudence, sought to
eliminate institutional actors as party plaintiffs almost entirely.
D. Justiciability, Separation of Powers, and the Roberts Court
Chief Justice Roberts clerked for then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in the 1980-1981
term, a year after Goldwater v. Carter, and though he assuredly was steeped in Rehnquist’s
views of the judiciary and its proper role in navigating inter-branch disputes, Roberts’ own views
since assuming his position in September 2005 – at least in the political question context – have
charted a different course, somewhat defiantly reclaiming a role for the federal judiciary.
187

a. The Political Question Doctrine: Reembracing the Boundary Cop
In the years between Nixon v. United States188 and 2012, the lower courts routinely
invoked the political question doctrine, particularly in the foreign policy context, to avoid
separation-of-powers disputes between coordinate branches, while the Supreme Court stayed out
of the fray.189 In 2012, in the absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court changed course.190 In
Zivotofsky I,191 the Court confronted a clash between Congress and the executive branch over the
recognition of Jerusalem. Congress had passed a statute requiring the State Department, upon
request, to record the place of birth of a baby born in Jerusalem as “Israel.”192 This requirement
flatly contravened the State Department’s manual, which ordered that the birthplace be recorded
as Jerusalem, specifically instructing that passport officials “not write Israel or Jordan.”193 In
signing the statute into law, President George W. Bush claimed that it unconstitutionally
interfered with the executive branch’s recognition power and indicated he would not enforce
it.194 Menachem Zivotofsky, born in Jerusalem after the act’s passage, challenged the State
Department’s refusal to designate his birthplace as Israel.195 The district court deemed the case a
nonjusticiable political question,196 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.197 The panel majority
concluded that Zivotofsky had asked the court to “call into question the President’s exercise of
the recognition power.”198
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Professor Harlan Cohen to surmise that “a large majority of the Justices (only Justice Breyer dissented) wanted to
discipline the lower courts in their use of the political question doctrine.” Cohen, supra note __, at 433.
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366
(2002).
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566 U.S. at 191-92.
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See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres.
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198
Id. at 1232.
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In “broad and sweeping terms,”199 the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Roberts.200 The Court saw the issue as whether the statute was a constitutional
exercise of legislative authority or whether it “impermissibly intrude[d] upon Presidential powers
under the Constitution”201 – a classic question of boundary-drawing. Examining the
constitutionality of a statute and determining whether one coordinate branch of government “is
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch,” the Court announced, is an appropriate
exercise of judicial authority that dates back to Marbury.202 The Court found that the parties’
arguments in the case “sound[ed] in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation,” requiring
“careful examination of textual, structural, and historical evidence”; this exercise, the Court
confirmed, is precisely “what courts do.”203
A case of “far-reaching significance,”204 Zivotofsky I firmly defended the Court’s role in
situations of inter-branch conflict, taking us back to first principles and to Chief Justice
Marshall’s vision in Marbury. It set to rest the confusing undercurrents exposed in Goldwater
and the various opinions in Nixon. Significantly, the Court found jurisdiction in a case even
though it was decidedly not simple,205 even though it involved no clear-cut constitutional rule,206
and even though it touched on a “delicate subject.”207 Unlike Rehnquist and his cohort in
Goldwater, the Court was unfazed by the fact that the Constitution was silent on the subject of
recognition power.208 Remarkably, the Court did not even cite Goldwater. Instead, it manifested
comfort making “interstitial” inferences and bringing to bear traditional methods of
interpretation.209 The case required the Court to draw difficult lines between the various foreign
affairs powers meted out by the Constitution in somewhat overlapping fashion to two different
institutional actors. The Court was unmoved by the dominant argument in Nixon v. United States
that the Constitution, in conferring power on the President to receive ambassadors and foreign
ministers, had made an unreviewable textual commitment of authority to another branch.210
Finally, the Court cited only two of the Baker v. Carr factors – textual commitment of authority
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reasonable disagreement.” Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1652 (2016). Greene
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to another branch and the presence or absence of judicially manageable standards211 -- thus
signaling that more prudential reasons for staying its hand, such as concern for institutional
legitimacy or reticence to intrude on other branches, held little force.212
The Court dramatically reaffirmed its comfort policing boundaries in Trump v. Mazars
USA, LLP.213 Writing for the Court to resolve a dispute between Congress and the President over
the issuance of congressional subpoenas, Chief Justice Roberts noted that Presidents and
Congress had spent two centuries working out such disputes themselves, hashing them out “in
the ‘hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the political process.”214 Though Rehnquist had cited
similar history in Raines to justify the conclusion that the federal judiciary should play a limited
role in the event of breakdown,215 the Roberts opinion chastised the parties a bit for their
recalcitrance, noted that the controversy “is the first of its kind to reach the Court,” and then
proceeded to resolve it, rejecting both sides’ proffered standards and laying out a series of
principles circumscribing congressional authority that specifically contemplated a role for the
federal courts.216 Once again, the Court seemed unfazed by the imprecise constitutional
underpinnings of the subpoena power and the absence of a precedential lodestar; recognizing a
breakdown in the political process, the Court dove in and provided roadmapping principles for
sorting it out.217
Reaching out in the absence of a circuit split to take Zivotofsky I, after nineteen years in
which the Court had looked the other way, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court
and announced the arrival of a new sheriff in town. Mazars makes the distinct approaches of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts obvious. Hearkening back to first principles, Roberts has
reclaimed an “emphatic” role for the federal judiciary in resolving litigation concerning the
constitutional authority of the other branches, the “political implications” that troubled his
forebear seemingly be damned.218
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b. Standing to Assert Separation-of-Powers Challenges
Despite announcing a bolder conception of its own role in Zivotofsky I, one with which
Chief Justice Rehnquist would not have agreed, the Roberts Court has largely contented itself
with Rehnquist’s handiwork in Raines, tap-dancing around it in a couple of cases and bending
over backwards to incentivize individual litigants to tee up separation-of-powers issues instead.
In a series of indirect confrontations with congressional standing, the Roberts Court has
consistently worked within the Raines construct. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”),219 the Court found that a state legislature had
standing to make an Elections Clause challenge to the redistricting plan of an independent state
commission created by popular referendum.220 The case distinguished Raines in three ways.
First, the entire legislature was suing as institutional plaintiff to vindicate an institutional
interest221 – a fact to which the Delphic Raines Court had attached “some importance.”222
Second, conferring the task of redistricting on an independent commission necessitated wresting
it from the state legislature altogether and thus rendered the legislature’s putative votes on
redistricting “a complete nullity,” as in Coleman.223 Third, the case did not involve Congress
and thus did not implicate the separation-of-powers concerns that may have undergirded
Raines.224 The opinion did not link these three points of distinction or suggest that all were
necessary components to its conclusion.
A litigation role for Congress also emerged in United States v. Windsor.225 The Obama
administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)226 on appeal prompted
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House to intervene and defend the
constitutionality of DOMA before the Supreme Court.227 In considering DOMA’s
constitutionality, the Court requested argument on the question whether BLAG had standing to
appeal the case.228 The Court ultimately sidestepped the question because it concluded that the
government’s obligation to pay a tax refund in the event the challengers prevailed gave it the
requisite stake in the proceedings.229 Invoking INS v. Chadha,230 the Court noted that BLAG’s
presence in the case ensured “sharp adversarial presentation” and found it unnecessary to decide
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whether BLAG had standing on its own behalf.231 Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas,
argued in dissent that BLAG had standing in its own right.232 He saw BLAG as the authorized
representative of the House, unlike the six individual legislators in Raines, and wrote that, in
refusing to defend the statute, the government was holding a majority of the House’s pro-DOMA
votes “for naught.”233
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed legislative standing in Virginia House of
Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,234 which asked whether the Virginia House of Delegates, one half of
the Virginia General Assembly, could intervene to appeal a decision invalidating a legislative
districting plan as an impermissible racial gerrymander.235 The Court noted that the case did not
present Coleman vote-nullification issues but rather “the constitutionality of a concededly
enacted redistricting plan.”236 Without Coleman facts, the key asserted distinction from Raines
was that the Virginia House itself, an official body, was seeking to litigate. Because the Virginia
House represented only a part of the General Assembly charged with redistricting authority, the
Court found the situation distinguishable from that in AIRC, in which both the Arizona House
and Senate had filed suit.237 The Court determined that this “mismatch” between the body
seeking to litigate and the body whose votes were purportedly undermined made this case more
like the six individual members suing in Raines.238 The Court concluded that “[o]ne House of [a]
bicameral legislature cannot alone continue the litigation against the will of its partners in the
legislative process.”239 Justice Alito, joined this time by three, again dissented and would have
found standing.240 He argued that Raines “rested heavily on federal separation-of-powers
concerns, which are notably absent here.”241
To date, the Roberts Court has paid lip service to Raines on multiple occasions,
frequently finding points of distinction, but has not confronted congressional standing head-on.
Perhaps because of existing obstacles to suits by institutional actors, the Court has instead
preferred individual litigants in fielding separation-of-powers questions. The Court has
entertained several kinds of claims that Congress has infringed on the power of the judicial
branch. Individual litigants have repeatedly pressed claims that Congress has unconstitutionally
conferred Article III business on Article I actors.242 The Court has fielded claims that Congress
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has impermissibly dictated the rules of decision in a pending case.243 Finally, the Court has
encountered challenges to congressional efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.244 In
each of these cases, the issues were raised by individual litigants, who grounded their claims in
individual assertions that Congress was interfering with their right to have an Article III judge
adjudicate their dispute.
With increasing alacrity, the Roberts Court has also decided cases involving claims that
Congress has infringed on the discretion or power of the executive branch or that the executive
branch has infringed upon an authority of Congress. The Court has entertained claims that a
decision maker in a coercive proceeding was not appointed in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause.245 Relatedly, the Court has also heard a challenge to congressional
restriction on the President’s removal power.246 As Zivotofsky II247 itself reflects, the Court has
entertained claims that Congress has interfered with executive authority over foreign affairs.248
The Court has heard challenges that the President has acted in derogation of or without adequate
legislative authority.249 Finally, the Court has fielded challenges to the President’s use of recess
appointments.250 In each of these cases, the Roberts Court has relied on individual litigants to
bring the claims within its purview.
Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission251 reflects the lengths to which the Court
has gone to ensure that separation-of-powers claims come to the federal courts.252 After agreeing
with Raymond Lucia that the administrative law judge who presided over his hearing on
243
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securities violations was an inferior officer whose appointment violated the Appointments
Clause,253 the Lucia Court clarified what appropriate relief might look like. Recognizing the
ease with which the underlying defect in a particular administrative law judge’s appointment
could be cured and the fact that the properly appointed administrative law judge would almost
certainly render the same decision, the Court held that Lucia needed a new hearing before a
different administrative law judge.254 In so doing, the Court forthrightly admitted both its goal of
creating “incentives” to raise Appointments Clause challenges and the fact that the defect had
had no impact whatsoever on Lucia’s initial hearing.255 The next section will criticize this
reliance; for present purposes, the important point is descriptive, not normative: the Court has
had to engage in some contortion in order to slake its appetite for cases, even going so far as to
incentivize litigants it could not otherwise count on to care.
II.

The Myriad Problems of Relying Exclusively on Individual Litigants

The Roberts Court has embraced the role of federal courts as boundary cops, disdaining
the approach taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist, without reexamining the role of institutional
players. This approach would make good sense if the Court could defensibly rely exclusively on
individual litigants. However, reliance on individual litigants as opposed to institutional actors
to bring separation-of-powers claims into the federal courts occasionally gives rise to doctrinal
incoherence. This section flags several ways in which the Court is doing something in this
separation-of-powers context that is hard to square with what it has said in others.
A. Individuals Frequently Lack Litigable Interests256 in the Structural Constitution
Reliance on individual litigants to raise separation-of-powers violations is often
problematic because their claims to individual harm due to the separation-of-powers violations
they assert are difficult to justify. Here, it is important to distinguish claims of entitlement to an
Article III decision-maker from other separation-of-powers claims, like the claim to a validly253
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appointed regulatory enforcement body. In the former situation, the individual’s interest has a
longstanding pedigree, and in the latter, it does not.
Where Congress encroaches on the power of the federal judiciary in violation of Article
III, individuals subject to non-Article III decision makers have a straightforward claim to legally
cognizable harm.257 Litigants maintaining that they are entitled to Article III adjudication of their
claims raise a particularized claim about the identity of the decision maker in their case because
the special features of Article III judges – the salary protection and life tenure guaranteed by
Article III – are vital to the substantive legitimacy of the outcome and have consistently been
described in individual-protective terms. In the Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that
the independence of the federal judiciary was an “essential safeguard” to protect individuals
against judges “unwilling to hazard the displeasure” of the political branches.258 Cases have
repeatedly reflected this core value. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif259 stated
outright that “[t]he entitlement to an Article III adjudicator is ‘a personal right.’”260 In Stern v.
Marshall, Pierce Marshall objected to adjudication of a tortious interference counterclaim in
non-Article III bankruptcy proceedings.261 The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, agreed, finding
that structural protections inherent in the separation of powers “protect the individual” as well as
each respective branch.262 The Court explained that the federal courts’ insulation from the
political process was designed “to ensure that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with
an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the ‘[c]lear heads . .
. and honest hearts’ deemed ‘essential to good judges.’”263 The key features differentiating
Article III judges from non-Article III judges are indispensable to a fair, impartial determination
of the litigant’s own claim, and common sense and tradition both buttress the idea that the
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individual litigant suffers an individualized injury by its threatened deprivation that is redressable
by a decision in his favor.264
Reliance on individual litigants is more problematic in other separation-of-powers cases,
where individuals’ claims of right, and claims to harm, can be more attenuated.265 Where the
individual’s claim is that a regulatory body is acting against her in a way that the Constitution
does not permit, the claim of harm is straightforward, and the individual has a privilege against
the regulatory action in question.266 But the claimed separation-of-powers violation in cases
challenging incursions on the executive and legislative branches frequently has no such obvious
or pedigreed link to a personal interest, and it is widely understood that litigants asserting many
claims as defenses in coercive non-judicial proceedings cannot show, indeed do not even attempt
to show, that the claimed defect actually tainted the proceeding’s substantive outcome.267
Outside of the Article III context, for example, the right to a properly appointed
regulatory actor or decision maker has not historically been seen as an entrenched personal
freedom. The traditional method of challenging an office holder’s appointment was through a
statutory quo warranto action, an action undertaken by the state or a designated representative in
which the validity of an office holder’s title was the only issue.268 Courts employed the de facto
264
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officer doctrine to exempt defects in title and appointment from collateral attack by people
displeased with their actions “[f]or over five hundred years.”269 In 1886, the Court based the
doctrine in “policy and necessity,” indicated that “[o]ffices are created for the benefit of the
public,” and stated that “endless confusion” would result if private parties were permitted in
every proceeding to call their title into question.270 Admittedly, the Supreme Court (per Chief
Justice Rehnquist), declined to invoke the de facto officer doctrine in Ryder v. United States and
accorded a court martial defendant a new hearing before a properly constituted military appellate
tribunal in 1995.271 In doing so, the Court was likely influenced by the nature of the
proceedings; while military courts have always operated outside the purview of Article III,272
Professor Stephen I. Vladeck has noted that “the U.S. military justice system has increasingly
come to resemble ordinary civilian courts in recent years, at least in criminal cases.”273 So, too,
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disaffection with institutional standing may have played a role; the
Ryder Court openly admitted its concern was with incentivizing litigants to raise such claims (as
the Roberts Court later did in Lucia).274 The Court did not suggest that its reasoning was
grounded in due process or systemic legitimacy, and it left prior cases that had relied on the de
facto officer doctrine in the Appointments Clause context intact.275 The point here is not to
criticized the quo warranto mechanism as “an extremely difficult and uncertain remedy” in Andrade v. Lauer, 729
F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 replaces the traditional quo warranto writ
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debate the de facto officer doctrine but to state, more modestly, that if Spokeo v. Robins276 and
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez277 instruct us to look to historical practice as a guide in recognizing
the concreteness of claims, finding an individual litigable interest in many separation-of-powers
cases runs into the distinct problem that until quite recently, the actions of defectively appointed
non-Article III entities who exercised de facto authority were unassailable at law.
While these litigants conceivably could frame their litigable interest as a right to a
validly-constituted regulatory body, that argument is not particularly persuasive. It is a secondcousin of the “valid rule” requirement, famously described by Professor Henry Paul
Monaghan.278 Per Monaghan, the rule of law, grounded in due process, requires “that the
Constitution forbid[] the imposition of sanctions except in accordance with a constitutionally
valid rule, whether or not the defendant's conduct is itself constitutionally privileged.”279 The
argument would have to be that no one can be sanctioned for violating a perfectly constitutional
statute by someone who appears to be, but actually is not, constitutionally entitled to say so. It
wrenches Monaghan’s formulation out of context to apply this principle not to the substantive
rule by which a litigant is judged but to a defect in the appointment of the decision maker. This
“defective messenger” argument seems less obviously to offend the rule of law – after all, the
claimant has by all accounts violated the rule, and the rule by all accounts validly proscribes the
claimant’s conduct. The difference between the regulatory arrangement claimants seek and the
regulatory arrangement claimants were provided lacks implications for the legitimacy or
outcome of the substantive result.280 Our system has never aspired to such perfection,
particularly given age-old reliance on the de facto officer doctrine, and Huq has criticized
invocation of the valid rule doctrine in this context as a “post hoc classification of outcomes.”281
Individuals might alternatively press these claims without showing individual injury if we
can classify them as “structural errors” requiring automatic reversal even in the absence of
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demonstrable harm.282 But this approach, too, is hard to justify. In Landry v. FDIC,283 the D.C.
Circuit wrestled with the absence of provable harm in an Appointments Clause case and
concluded that such challenges, termed “structural” at times by the Supreme Court,284 might in
fact represent “structural errors.”285 The Landry court took the Supreme Court’s use of the term
“structural” to describe the nature of the claim, arising as it does as an inference from the
Constitution’s structure, and borrowed it to explain the absence of any traditionally-understood
injury or individual interest. The key to the Landry court’s analysis was that litigants in these
kinds of cases might never be able to demonstrate harm, and there is a built-in circularity to the
court’s conclusion.286 The Supreme Court itself has never found structural error in the civil
context.287 Certainly, calling these kinds of errors “structural” would be a marriage of
convenience that would allow the Court to dodge the absence of real injury; on the other hand,
these claims do not fit naturally or logically with other structural errors like total deprivation of
counsel in a criminal case,288 systematic exclusion of people of a certain race from petit289 or
grand juries,290 or a biased trial judge,291 all of which present questions of “grave constitutional
trespass”292 that “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of criminal
proceedings.293 Again, the five hundred years during which the de facto officer doctrine
routinely permitted courts to overlook defects in the appointment or title of office holders and
insulate them from collateral attack tend to undercut the argument that these kinds of defects
represent structural error, at least as we have previously understood the term.294
The first difficulty with relying on individuals to raise separation-of-powers challenges,
then, is that only sometimes do they have what we have traditionally recognized as a litigable

282

See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967)). The term “structural error” has its origins in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). In the
portion of his opinion that was for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist differentiated “trial error[s],” which are subject
to harmless error analysis, from “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,” like deprivation of the
right to counsel, a biased judge, and exclusion of black jurors from the grand jury pool. Id.
283
204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
284
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (describing doctrine of separation of powers
as a “structural safeguard”).
285
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131. See also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 793 F.3d 111, 123
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Landry for the proposition that “an Appointments Clause violation is a structural error that
warrants reversal regardless of whether prejudice can be shown”).
286
See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131. In Weaver v. Massachusetts, the Court did say that it occasionally finds structural
error when “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure.” 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). The Court cited
for this principle Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), in which the Court found structural error in the systematic
exclusion of prospective grand jurors of defendant’s race from the grand jury pool because such errors struck at
“fundamental values of our system and our society as a whole” and constituted “grave constitutional trespass.” Id.
at 262. Given the Vasquez citation, it is difficult to read Weaver for the proposition that the mere immeasurability of
impact of any error makes it structural.
287
See Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011).
288
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
289
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
290
Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260-64.
291
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
292
Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 262.
293
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997).
294
See Columbia Note, supra note __, at 909.

34

personal right. The special features of an Article III judge have long been conceptualized as
protective of the individual and give rise to litigable rights and interests, while the harm suffered
by individuals subject to defectively appointed regulatory decision makers traditionally has not.
Efforts to analogize to the “valid rule” concept or to label these errors “structural” and vindicable
absent any showing of harm require great leaps. The Court has assumed litigants’ ability to raise
separation-of-powers claims in a defensive posture but has spent little effort to explain why this
is so. If concrete individual interests are a function of history or common sense, as Spokeo and
TransUnion instruct, the Court’s practice of relying on individuals to raise these claims is
difficult to square with existing jurisprudence.
B. The Court’s (Sub Silentio) Creation of a Private Attorney General Mechanism Is
Inconsistent with Case Law
The Supreme Court’s efforts to generate incentives for these litigants, too, are
problematic and out of step with what the Court has said in other contexts. In Ryder v. United
States,295 the Court allowed that individual litigants making timely separation-of-powers
challenges are entitled to a judgment on the merits and “whatever relief may be appropriate,” as
“any other rule would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges.”296 The
Lucia Court, recognizing the ease with which the underlying defect in a particular administrative
law judge’s appointment could be cured and the fact that the properly appointed administrative
law judge would almost certainly render the same decision, afforded Lucia a new hearing before
a different administrative law judge.297 The Lucia Court did not mention the valid rule doctrine,
harmless error, structural error, or standing in its analysis. Lucia evinces the Court’s desire to
provide a lane for certain separation-of-powers challenges and reflects a Court that is not terribly
concerned about how or why it is, exactly, that individual litigants like Ryder and Lucia are wellsituated to bring them.298
Thirty-five years ago, Professor Monaghan likened the empowerment of individuals to
assert separation-of-powers claims to recognition of a private attorney general,299 and Lucia aptly
demonstrates his point. The Court has conferred a possible bounty – a second bite at regulatory
proceedings for the disappointed litigant – on individual claimants in an effort to drum up
lawsuits that primarily serve other, more institutional interests. Monaghan acknowledged that
Congress could create and confer such bounties under its Article I powers, but questioned, “what
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is the source of judicial authority to license such suits on the Court’s own motion?”300
Monaghan speculated that the Court might be creating constitutional common law.301 Perhaps
so. But indulging in constitutional common law to create remedies in this area is difficult to
square with the Court’s modern reticence to imply constitutional remedies in other contexts.302
The Court has clearly communicated that implied constitutional remedies under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,303 for example, are a relic of an
“ancien regime” whose expansion is now a “’disfavored’ judicial activity.”304 This retreat from
the implication of remedies not prescribed by Congress is grounded in a conception of the
judicial power.305 The Court has repeatedly forsworn the creation of remedies to effectuate its
own “policy” preferences,306 and its unexamined willingness to “have one last drink”307 – or
more – in this context is remarkable.
It is also difficult to square with prior statements the Court has made about the judicial
power to create private attorney general mechanisms, specifically.308 In Alyeska Pipeline
Services Co. v. Wilderness Society,309 the Court held that federal courts cannot, absent legislative
authority, provide attorneys’ fees to victorious private attorneys general, for fear that they will
end up giving effect to their own “substantive law preferences and priorities.”310 Certainly, there
is a distinction between the provision of attorneys’ fees and the requirement that a prevailing
litigant get a new hearing before a different decision maker. However, the problem in Alyeska
Pipeline was the Court substituting its own will to prefer some litigants and claims over others,
and this is how commentators have understood it. Professor Judith Resnik read in Alyeska
Pipeline the proposition that “the Supreme Court forbade judges from selecting litigants to
reward for entering courts in pursuit of public norm enforcement.”311 Professor Owen Fiss noted
“the Court’s insistence in Alyeska Pipeline that any expansion of the concept of the private
attorney general would require specific statutory authorization.”312
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The Court’s effort to incentivize these litigants by creating a bounty is questionable
absent statutory authority. At the same time that other implied constitutional remedies are on the
wane, the Court has taken a uniquely active stance in this context, reaching out to ensure itself a
steady diet of a particular, favored claim.
C. Individuals Will Be Challenged to Present Certain Separation-of-Powers Claims
In addition to its tension with conventional notions of the judicial power, reliance on
individuals to raise separation-of-powers claims also can give rise to substantive gaps. Not every
unconstitutionally appointed officer, for example, acts in a manner that subjects individuals to
enforcement proceedings or coercive action. In these cases, no individual litigants can come
forward, and barring institutional actors from court may mean the courts have no mechanism for
policing inter-branch boundaries at all.
Take, for instance, the unsuccessful challenges to the composition of the Federal Reserve
System’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The FOMC controls the nation’s money
supply and is arguably “the country’s most important agency.”313 Blessed both with
“extraordinary independence and relative opacity,”314 the FOMC uses the purchase and sales of
government securities in the open market as a tool to control the nation’s interest rates.315 The
FOMC’s decisions and actions in the market have a significant effect on the U.S. economy.316
Per the statute, the FOMC is comprised of the seven members of the Board of Governors, all
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fourteen-year terms, the president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four other regional presidents on a rotating basis.317
Regional presidents are appointed by a board of directors selected by private banks and the
Board of Governors.318 At any given time, therefore, five voting members of the FOMC have
not been appointed by the President or a Head of Department. Whether this arrangement
actually violates the Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of this article; however, the claim
that the regional president members of the FOMC exercise “significant authority” sufficient to
put them into the “Officer,” rather than “lesser functionary,” category is certainly credible after
Lucia v. SEC.319
In Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System,320 the D.C. Circuit fielded a challenge to the composition of the FOMC by a non-profit
organization and 800 other corporations, businesses, and individuals claiming harm due to
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“devastatingly high interest rates” caused by FOMC policies.321 The unanimous panel denied
standing. Accepting that high interest rates caused measurable injury, the court found the
challenged FOMC members’ influence on any particular policy and the impact of any particular
policy on the claimed adverse conditions to be too speculative to support causation.322 The court
rejected the litigants’ effort to analogize their role to that of the litigants in Buckley v. Valeo,323
reasoning that, “[b]y contrast to the litigants in Buckley, the appellants here do not allege they are
directly subject to the governmental authority they seek to challenge, but merely assert that they
are substantially affected by the exercise of that authority.”324 The court concluded that, to
permit a challenge by anyone “indirectly affected” by a policy would require courts to field
“generalized grievance[s] shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens.”325 The court thus held that “litigants have standing to challenge the authority of an
agency on separation-of-powers grounds only where they are directly subject to the authority of
the agency, whether such authority is regulatory, administrative, or adjudicative in nature.”326
The composition of an entity charged with policymaking authority that affects vast sectors of the
American economy thus eluded challenge by individual actors – even in the face of a credible
Appointments Clause claim – because individuals were not provably hurt by the defect and
because the body did not directly subject any individuals to its authority.327
These are not the only separation-of-powers claims that may be difficult for individuals
to bring. Shutdown of legislative standing and exclusive reliance on individual litigants may
make it difficult for courts to field Emoluments Clause challenges. The Foreign Emoluments
Clause of the Constitution prohibits U.S. office holders from “accept[ing] . . . any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state”
without “the Consent of the Congress.”328 The Supreme Court has not elaborated on the
meaning of the clause.329 Designed to avert corruption, the Clause is an effort to prevent
officeholders from being “seduced by baubles and titles to put favor toward other countries
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before patriotism.”330 Corruption, a “’crucial term’ for the American Framers,” was “discussed
more often in the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or instability.”331 The
Clause gives Congress a textually-committed role in preclearing any foreign gift “of any kind
whatsoever,” in the absence of which its receipt is presumably prohibited.332
After the inauguration of President Donald Trump, litigants brought three lawsuits
challenging his ownership of and participation in an extensive business empire that includes the
Trump Tower in New York and the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C. These
lawsuits each took a different tack in attempting to satisfy the requisites of standing doctrine,
with the first filed by a consumer watchdog group and individual litigants alleging increased
monitoring costs and competitive injury (“Competitor/Watchdog Complaint”),333 the second
filed by the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia alleging injury to sovereign and
proprietary interests (“State Complaint”),334 and the third filed by 215 members of Congress
alleging institutional injury (“Congressional Complaint”).335 Reasonable minds can disagree on
the standing questions, and each case took a serpentine path. The Second Circuit reversed a
decision of the district court denying standing336 in the Competitor/Watchdog Complaint337 and
subsequently denied a petition for rehearing en banc. A Fourth Circuit panel initially granted a
petition for mandamus and reversed the district court decision338 finding standing in the State
Complaint,339 but the en banc court reversed the panel decision, finding insufficient “clear and
indisputable” basis to invoke the “drastic” remedy of mandamus.340 The Supreme Court granted
both petitions for certiorari and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot after President
Biden’s inauguration.341 Finally, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court decision granting
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standing in the Congressional Complaint, relying entirely on Raines v. Byrd.342 The Supreme
Court denied the petition for certiorari on October 13, 2020.343
Whether individual and state plaintiffs, proceeding on a competitor standing theory, can
bring Emoluments challenges is difficult to predict, and circumstance afforded no definitive call.
However, there may be reasons for skepticism, as even those supportive of competitor standing
in this context call it “a complicated and close question.”344 Competitors may face an uphill
climb in establishing that they are within a class of plaintiffs whose interests the Emoluments
Clause protects. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,345 the Court
clarified that “zone of interests” is not a standing concept but a conventional inquiry that – in the
statutory context, at least – “requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular
plaintiff’s claim.”346 In Alexander v. Sandoval,347 the Court put a tight rein on this inquiry,
instructing that judges are not to find litigable rights absent clear intent from Congress and “may
not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with
the statute.”348 Ziglar v. Abbasi suggests this same inquiry may be relevant in inferring rights of
action under the Constitution.349 It is plausible that the confluence of Lexmark, Sandoval, and
Ziglar will lead the Court to deploy an original understanding of the anti-corruption purposes of
the Foreign Emoluments Clause to preclude individual competitors from filing suit, at least
absent a statute expressly conferring a right of action.350 If institutional actors cannot step into
the breach, the Emoluments Clause may be the proverbial parchment barrier.
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III.

Revisiting Raines: The Case for Limited Institutional Standing Under Existing
Precedent

The role of individuals in vindicating most separation-of-powers values is often
problematic, and the Court’s limited conception of institutional standing, laid out in Raines v.
Byrd351 by the Goldwater v. Carter352 author, is in tension with the Roberts Court’s repudiation
of a sidelined role for the federal judiciary in Zivotofsky I353 and, most recently, in Trump v.
Mazars USA, LLP.354 To resolve this tension, one can find room in Raines for a narrower
reading, one that may legitimately be asserted without overruling or engaging in unprincipled
“confining.”355 It is possible, consistent with Coleman, Raines, AIRC, and Virginia House of
Delegates, to permit limited standing by individual institutional actors whose institutional
prerogatives, such as votes or rights to appoint, are overridden by a coordinate branch.
First, though, a concession. One can absolutely read Raines to nearly eviscerate
institutional standing, if one is inclined, and lower courts and commentators that have done so
have not acted unreasonably.356 Chief Justice Rehnquist was not messing around. The Court
ultimately appeared to preserve Coleman’s conclusion that individual legislators could assert
institutional injury, but it did so only after a lengthy paragraph poo-pooing the idea altogether.357
The Court disdainfully noted that the case pertained to “state legislators”358 and did its best to put
the case into a box.359 The Court drew much insight from the fact that prior clashes among
coordinate branches had not played out in federal court.360 The Court’s purpose was plainly to
harrumph at the idea of either Congress or the President taking an institutional battle into a
judicial forum.361 Anyone seeking to put legislative standing into a tiny box consisting of Powell
v. McCormack and mirror-image Coleman facts has ample fodder in Raines to do so; anyone
unwilling to cede even Coleman standing to congressional actors can – as Judge Trevor
McFadden362 and Justice Alito363 did – pick up on the fact that conferring standing on state
legislators raises no separation-of-powers concerns. Raines can indeed be read broadly, if that is
one’s inclination.
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But should it? The Roberts Court appears to want these cases and believes it has a role to
play when two branches square off in a turf dispute.364 Because of Raines, the Court has felt
constrained to rely on suits by individuals whose claims to litigable interests are often dubious
and whose incentivization rests uneasily with the Court’s understanding of its own authority in
other areas.365 Raines commanded the majority vote that eluded Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Goldwater v. Carter; thus, the present Court cannot simply ignore the case (as Zivotofsky I
ignored Goldwater). However, there are ways to read Raines that allow institutional actors
limited, and systemically beneficial, forms of standing. Setting aside the bluster, Raines
addressed a particular kind of claim – a comparatively easy claim for the denial of standing –
from which other kinds of institutional standing can, and should, be distinguished.
This part proceeds in two sections. First, I make the case that the actual holding of
Raines is fairly modest. Then, having minimized Raines, I will develop the “Coleman claim”
concept further, making the case for the limited kinds of institutional standing that ought to be
permissible.
A. What Raines Did and Didn’t Do
It is important at the outset to decouple the holding of Raines from its dicta.366 The
Raines Court relied extensively on dogs that didn’t bark – the fact that past Presidents had not
brought suit to enforce limitations on their removal or appointment powers.367 A challenge to the
President’s authority to file suit in federal court was not before the Raines Court. At a minimum,
though it clearly expressed a mood, Raines thus says nothing binding or authoritative about
executive standing. The ability of the executive branch to resist incursions on its authority by
outside actors – hinted at in FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund368 – remains an open question
that has not been foreclosed by any Supreme Court decision.369
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Focusing in, then, on congressional standing, it is important to differentiate two kinds of
claims – claims where the claimant asserts that his own chamber has inflicted institutional injury
and claims where the claimant asserts that a different branch of government has inflicted an
institutional injury. In the former situation, but not the latter, there are obvious mechanisms for
self-help, and standing, indeed a role for the judiciary at all, is more problematic.370 Raines
confronted precisely this situation: a challenge by members of Congress to a statute on which
they had just (unsuccessfully) voted.371 Such a claim could never be conceptualized in Coleman
terms because by definition, the members’ votes had counted. There simply were too few of
them, and the members had in hand the ability to amend or repeal the statute upon convincing
sufficient numbers of their colleagues.372 Raines cited the self-help remedies the putative
litigants possessed in support of its holding.373 Again, Raines undeniably reflects a shut-it-down
mood, but the sole claim before the Court, and thus the sole claim actually addressed, was an
intra-chambers dispute, a congressional “own goal” that presented a straightforward case for
denial of standing.374 Raines did not confront claimed injury at the hands of another,
overreaching branch.
Raines also did not say that Coleman claims could only be asserted by an entire
legislative body, and AIRC375 and Virginia House of Delegates376 didn’t either. Although the
penultimate paragraph in Raines attached “some importance” to the fact that plaintiffs had not
been authorized to represent their respective houses, the Raines Court did not connect this
absence of authorization to the Coleman claim it had begrudgingly preserved six pages earlier in
another section of the opinion.377 Indeed, to do so, it would have had to overrule that portion of
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Coleman permitting a subset of state senators to bring suit, something the Raines Court’s
approving reference to individual “legislators” in Coleman plainly refuted.378 In AIRC, the Court
found two bases to distinguish Raines. First, the entire Arizona legislature, rather than individual
members, had brought suit, and second, the case presented a Coleman claim in that legislators,
stripped of their ability to vote on districting, could claim practical nullification.379 The Court
did not suggest that both of these factors were necessary to confer standing.380 The Virginia
House of Delegates case did not involve a Coleman claim at all, a fact the Court emphasized.381
Thus, in distinguishing the case from AIRC on the basis that only one chamber of the Virginia
legislature had sought to appeal, the Virginia House of Delegates case did not suggest in any way
that participation and authorization of both chambers is a necessary feature of a Coleman claim.
Finally, although the Raines Court made a footnoted suggestion that it might additionally
be able to distinguish Coleman, which involved state legislators, because it did not raise the same
separation-of-powers concerns, the Court stopped short of deciding the question.382 AIRC
likewise noted in a footnote that the case dealt with a state legislature, rather than Congress, as
an additional point of distinction from Raines, but again it did not state that a Coleman claim
lacked applicability to members of Congress.383
In Raines, then, the Court confronted a simple claim by a handful of individual members
of Congress that the statute passed by their colleagues, on which they had just unsuccessfully
voted “nay,” was a flawed statute. Their suit transparently sought another bite at a political
process that had worked, albeit one that had not ended as they wished.384 The injury they posited,
that the line item veto granted to the President trammeled on their institutional prerogatives,
534, 544 (1985), and an 1892 decision in which the Court rejected a Congressman’s challenge to internal House
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diluting their power, was one inflicted by Congress itself. Raines begrudgingly left Coleman
intact and did not circumscribe it to its state context; did not directly connect its preservation of
Coleman to official authorization by the entire body; and did not say anything binding about
standing of other institutional actors. Put simply, Raines left quite a bit of room.
B. Chiseling Out the Coleman Claim: What Claims Institutional Actors Ought to Be
Able to Assert
Room, that is, for a properly-defined federal Coleman claim, which ought to have several
distinguishing and limiting features drawn from existing precedent and a delimited Raines. The
federal courts’ role should not be to pretermit the political process, and this article does not
contend that federal courts should be the place of first resort when coordinate branches overstep.
Quite the contrary, the federal courts’ role emerges out of necessity when dysfunction overtakes
the process and opportunities for self-help and political resolution are not available, a principle
reflected most recently in the Court’s unflinching examination of a clash over the congressional
subpoena power in Trump v. Mazars.385 The first resort should always be the “tradition of
negotiation and compromise” 386; the problem, though, is that the tradition these days is
increasingly honored in the breach.
The first thing a cognizable Coleman claim needs a proper target. Unlike in Raines, a
Coleman claim must be asserted against a coordinate branch actor, against which the plaintiff
presumptively has fewer avenues for self-help, rather than against the plaintiff’s own branch.
The suit itself may reflect the plaintiff’s calculus that the branches are at a political impasse. The
federal courts, in such circumstances, are not invited into an unseemly relitigation of a political
battle properly waged in another arena; rather, they are asked to draw lines and ensure that each
branch is respecting the separation-of-powers scheme anticipated by the framers. In such
circumstances, the federal court, as in Zivotofsky I, is called upon for “careful examination of the
textual, structural, and historical evidence” – that is to say, called to do court-like things.387
Second, a Coleman claim must plausibly demonstrate that the defendant actor has
usurped an institutional prerogative that is constitutionally allocated to the plaintiff’s office,
overrunning boundaries and hindering the plaintiff’s ability to perform as the Constitution
anticipates. In Coleman, the tie-breaking actions of the lieutenant governor stripped votes that
had already been cast of their effect.388 Despite Raines’ attempt to cabin Coleman to its precise
factual context, the Court in AIRC made clear that “nullification” is a more capacious concept.389
In AIRC, the state legislature challenged the legislative districting plan drawn by an independent
redistricting commission, contending that the plan and the commission deprived the state
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legislature of its role in drawing legislative districts in violation of the Elections Clause.390 The
state legislature had neither voted on nor submitted its own plan.391 The Court found Coleman
sufficiently analogous because the scheme would nullify, “now or ‘in the future,’” any role for
the legislature in the redistricting process.392 It was enough, in other words, that the legislature
claimed its prescribed role in the process had been foreclosed; the Court did not need to see or
count up actual, already-cast votes. Properly understood, the Coleman claim should encompass
situations where an institutional actor constitutionally should have some role, and another branch
deprives it of the opportunity to play it.
Third, while it is not necessary to a Coleman claim that the whole legislative body join
the suit, the Court’s precedents support the requirement that there should be a sufficient number
of plaintiffs that their participation in the process (from which they were excluded) could have
been outcome-determinative. Sound legal and prudential reasons support this limitation, without
which the federal courts might become enmired in lawsuits filed by individual actors whose
claims of injury are insufficiently concrete and for whom political remedies may still exist.393
Importantly, requiring participation of an outcome-determinative group limits the Court’s
intercession to redressable conflicts. Again, the point of permitting institutional standing should
be that the political process has broken down; one branch has precluded another from its
participatory role and left the other with paltry means of self-help. Requiring sufficient plaintiffs
to have changed the outcome comports with the instincts of the Raines, AIRC, and Virginia
House of Delegates Courts that the endorsement of the official body matters at the margins.394
However, though participation of the whole body in a lawsuit suffices to confer institutional
standing, it is not necessary where an outcome-determinative voting bloc has joined, as Coleman
itself illustrates. Coleman involved half of the state senate, all of whom had voted no, and their
votes, without the participation of the lieutenant governor, “would have been decisive to defeat
ratification.”395 Their claim, in other words, was that the outcome that would have obtained was
distorted by the nullification. AIRC was a suit filed by the whole legislative body, but nothing in
the Court’s opinion precludes the inference that a majority of voting members of each house
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could likewise have brought the suit, claiming their right to approve an alternative districting
scheme, and thus the result of the process, was likewise distorted.396
Examining the viability of a Coleman claim in the Emoluments Clause context makes it
more concrete. In Blumenthal v. Trump, 172 members of the House and thirty members of the
Senate claimed that the President’s receipt of foreign emoluments without congressional consent
violated the Constitution, injuring them in their institutional capacities by depriving them of their
right to confer or withhold consent.397 They had a proper target: Their quarrel was not with their
own chamber; instead, they claimed that an outside actor, the President, was doing something he
was powerless to do unless they had specifically authorized him to do it.398 Like the injury in
AIRC, their claim sounded in vote nullification; by failing to seek consent from Congress, the
President had afforded its members no opportunity to vote on consent at all.399 So far so good.
However, while their target and their claim sounded in Coleman terms, the Blumenthal plaintiffs
were insufficiently numerous. A majority of voters in both chambers would be required to
approve an emolument via a joint resolution400; thus, a majority of voters in either chamber
would have been sufficient to withhold approval of an emolument. Had a majority of the House
signed onto the Complaint, standing would have been proper. However, with less than a
majority from either chamber in the caption, and thus a majority in both chambers not
participating in the lawsuit, the Blumenthal plaintiffs’ vote nullification claim did not give rise to
a tangibly disrupted outcome, thus defeating their claim to standing.
CONCLUSION
A rift amongst the justices as to the appropriate role for the federal judiciary in clashes
between coordinate branches evaded repair in Goldwater v. Carter401 and found seeming
resolution in Raines v. Byrd.402 In the Rehnquist era, the Court invoked separation-of-powers to
keep itself largely sidelined and was content to leave Congress and the President to their political
remedies. With Zivotofsky I,403 the Roberts Court reasserted its role in patrolling the boundaries
of coordinate branches’ authority and checking them when they intrude upon each other’s
prerogatives. Reading the Constitution’s text, drawing inferences from its structure, and
considering historical context, the Court reasoned, are “what courts do,” even when the questions
are difficult and even when they trench on sensitive areas, like authority to conduct foreign
396
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affairs.404 Trump v. Mazars solidifies the Court’s perception of its role: It is willing to dive into
and resolve a conflict between coordinate branches even when their impasse is historic and even
when the Constitution provides no clear answers.405
While the Roberts Court has asserted its confidence in providing answers in the grey
areas where coordinate branches intersect, it has relied primarily on individual litigants to broach
these claims. This occasionally works. For example, where Congress has wrested an Article III
decision maker from an individual litigant in a private rights case, the individual litigant has
suffered the unique harm of losing a decision maker who is insulated from the political process.
Outside the Article III context, though, it frequently does not work. Individual litigants suffer no
real injury when they are subject to coercive action by someone appointed during an intrasession recess or by an actor other than a head of department. Recognizing this, the Court has
creatively imposed bounties for successful litigants, allowing them an additional spin of the
wheel, one last chance to obtain a desired substantive outcome that is unrelated to the separationof-powers violation they have successfully pressed. The Court’s liberties with doctrine in this
area, and its use of a de facto private attorney general mechanism improvised by judicial fiat, are
difficult to square with what the Court has done and said in other contexts. Moreover, reliance
on individual litigants is spotty. The branches can and frequently do clash and usurp each
other’s prerogatives in ways that touch no individual litigants at all.
This article flags both the Roberts Court’s willingness to take on these claims and the
conceptual difficulty with its reliance on individual litigants and urges that age-old limitations on
institutional standing deserve another look. Looking directly at the issue before Raines, what it
preserved, and what the Court has done in related areas since, this article finds room for limited
institutional standing where one branch circumvents the role of another branch, leaving it
without recourse and unable to perform its constitutionally allocated role in the process, and the
number of plaintiffs joined would be sufficient to have changed the result. Admitting that Raines
v. Byrd reflects a mood disdainful of purported judicial intermeddling that can be read
expansively, this article sets that mood aside as a relic of another Court, another era, and another
conception of the judicial function.
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